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Vertex classification is vulnerable to perturbations of both graph topology and vertex attributes, as shown in recent research. As in
other machine learning domains, concerns about robustness to adversarial manipulation can prevent potential users from adopting
proposed methods when the consequence of action is very high. This paper considers two topological characteristics of graphs and
explores the way these features affect the amount the adversary must perturb the graph in order to be successful. We show that, if
certain vertices are included in the training set, it is possible to substantially an adversary’s required perturbation budget. On four
citation datasets, we demonstrate that if the training set includes high degree vertices or vertices that ensure all unlabeled nodes
have neighbors in the training set, we show that the adversary’s budget often increases by a substantial factor—often a factor of 2 or
more—over random training for the Nettack poisoning attack. Even for especially easy targets (those that are misclassified after just
one or two perturbations), the degradation of performance is much slower, assigning much lower probabilities to the incorrect classes.
In addition, we demonstrate that this robustness either persists when recently proposed defenses are applied, or is competitive with
the resulting performance improvement for the defender.
1 INTRODUCTION
Classification of vertices in graphs is an important problem in a variety of applications, from e-commerce (classifying
users for targeted advertising) to security (classifying computer nodes as malicious or not) to bioinformatics (classifying
roles in a protein interaction network). In the past several years, numerous methods have been developed for this
task (see, e.g., [12, 16]). More recently, research has focused on attacks by adversaries [8, 29] and robustness to such
attacks [25]. If an adversary were able to insert misleading data into the training set (e.g., generate benign traffic during
a data collection period that could cover its behavior during testing/inference time), the chance of successfully evading
detection would increase (which is undesirable to the data analyst).
To classify vertices in the presence of adversarial activity, we must implement learning systems that are robust to
such potential manipulation. If such malicious behavior has low cost to the attacker and imposes high cost on the
data analyst, machine learning systems will not be trusted and adopted for use in practice, especially in high-stakes
scenarios such as network security and traffic safety. Understanding how to achieve robustness is key to realizing the
full potential of machine learning.
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Adversaries, of course, will attempt to conceal their manipulation. In a recent paper, Zügner et al. propose an
adversarial technique called Nettack [29], which can create perturbations that are subtle while still being extremely
effective in decreasing performance on the target vertices. The authors use their poisoning attack against a graph
convolutional network (GCN).
From a defender’s perspective, we aim to make it more difficult for the attacker to cause node misclassification. In
addition to changing the properties of the classifier itself, there may be portions of a complex network that provide
more information for learning than others. Complex networks are highly heterogeneous and random sampling may
not be the best way to obtain labels. If there is flexibility in the means of obtaining training data, the defender should
leverage what is known about the graph topology.
This paper demonstrates that leveraging complex network properties can improve robustness of GCNs in the presence
of adversaries. We focus on two alternative techniques for training data selection. In both methods, we aim to train
with a subset of nodes that are well connected to the held out set. Here we see a benefit, often raising the number of
perturbations required for a given level of attack success by a factor of 2 to 4. When it is possible to pick a specific
subset on which to train, this can provide a significant advantage. Some combination of these methods will likely be
useful to develop a more robust vertex classification system.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We propose two methods—StratDegree and GreedyCover—for selecting training data that put a greater
burden on attackers.
• We demonstrate that the robustness gained via these methods cannot be reliably obtained by simply increasing
the amount of randomly selected training data.
• We adapt Nettack so that the attacker is aware of the training set selection method and illustrate that the
advantage is maintained when the attacker adapts.
• We show that the data selection methods are competitive with defenses recently proposed in the literature.
• We identify a potential tradeoff between overall classifier performance and robustness to attack.
These contributions all point toward interesting future research in this area, such as determining the conditions under
which such methods are effective.1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the vertex classification problem and the
Nettack method. Section 3 details the methods we investigate to provide greater robustness, and Section 4 outlines the
experimental setup, including adaptations of Nettack and descriptions of defenses from the open literature. Section 5
documents several experimental results, illustrating the effectiveness of the proposed methods. In Section 6, we briefly
contextualize our work within the current literature. In Section 7 we conclude with a summary and outline open
problems and future work.
2 PROBLEMMODEL
We consider the vertex classification problem as described in [29], where we are given a graph G = (V ,E) of size
N = |V | and an N × d matrix of vertex attributes X . Each node has an arbitrary numeric index from 1 to N . For this
work, as in [29], we consider only binary attributes. In addition to its d attributes, each node has a label denoting its
class. We enumerate classes as integers from 1 to C . Given a subset of labeled instances, the goal is to correctly classify
the unlabeled nodes.
1An early version of this work appeared in [15].
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The focus of [29] is on GCNs, which make use of the adjacency matrix for the graph A = {ai j }, where ai j is 1 if
there is an edge between node i and node j and is 0 otherwise. The GCN applies a symmetrized graph convolution to
the input layer. That is, if we let D be the diagonal matrix of vertex degrees—i.e., the ith diagonal entry is the number of
edges connected to vertex i , dii =
∑N
j=1 ai j—then the output of the first layer of the network is expressed as
H = σ
(
D−1/2AD−1/2XW1
)
,
whereW1 is a weight matrix, X is a feature matrix whose ith row is xTi (the attribute vector for row vertex i), and σ is
the rectifier function. From the hidden layer to the output layer, a similar graph convolution is performed, followed by
a softmax output:
Y = softmax
(
D−1/2AD−1/2HW2
)
.
The focus in [29] is on GCNs with a single hidden layer. Each vertex is then classified according to the largest entry in
the corresponding row of Y .
The vertex attack proposed in [29] operates on a surrogate model where the rectifier function is replaced by a linear
function, thus approximating the overall network as
Y ≈ softmax
((
D−1/2AD−1/2
)2
XW1W2
)
(1)
= softmax
((
D−1/2AD−1/2
)2
XW
)
.
Nettack uses a greedy algorithm to determine how to perturb both A and X to make the GCN misclassify a target node.
The changes are intended to be “unnoticeable,” i.e., the degree distribution of G and the co-occurrence of features are
changed negligibly. Using the approximation in (1), Nettack perturbs by either adding or removing edges or turning
off binary features so that the classification margin is reduced the most at each step. Note that while it can change
the topology and the features, Nettack does not change the labels of any vertices. An additional variation on Nettack
allows either “direct” attacks, in which the target node itself has its edges and features changed, or indirect “influencer”
attacks, where the neighbors of the target have their data altered.
The classifier is evaluated in a context where only some of the labels are known, and the labeled data are split into
training and validation sets. To train the GCN, 10% of the data are selected at random (or by one of the alternative
methods outlined in Section 3), and another 10% is selected for validation. The remaining 80% is the test data. After
training, nodes are selected for attack among those that are correctly classified: the 10 where the margin is largest,
the 10 where the margin is smallest, and 20 more at random. Each of these is taken as a target node for attack in an
experiment. The attack is evaluated based on how much the classification margin decreases for the targeted nodes.
Taking the perspective of a defender against the attack, we want to ensure that this decrease in margin is minimized.
The goal is to determine how to make the classifier as robust as possible to this attack, making the attacker as ineffective
as possible for any given level of perturbation.
3 PROPOSED METHODS
As we investigated classification performance using Nettack, we noted that nodes in the test set with many neighbors
in the training set were more likely to be correctly classified. This dependence on labeled neighbors is consistent with
previous observations [18]. We observed this effect using the standard method of training data selection used in the
original Nettack paper: randomly select 10% for training, 10% for validation, and 80% for testing. This observation
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suggested that a training set that provides something like a vertex cover—a kind of “scaffolding” for the unlabeled
data—could make the classification more robust.
We considered two methods to test this hypothesis. The first simply chooses the highest-degree nodes to be in the
training set. The top 10% of each class is chosen for the training data, and the remaining 90% is randomly split (stratified
by class) into test (80%) and validation (10%), maintaining the proportions of the original experiment in [29]. We refer
to the stratified degree-based thresholding method as StratDegree. The other method uses a greedy approach in an
attempt to ensure every node has at least a minimal number of neighbors in the training set. Starting with an empty
training set and a threshold k = 0, we iteratively add the node with the largest number of neighbors connected to at
most k nodes in the training set. When there are no such neighbors, we increment k . This procedure continues until we
have the desired proportion of the overall dataset for training (again, 10% in our experiments). The remaining data
are randomly partitioned into test and validation sets. Algorithm 1 provides the pseudo-code. In this case, there is no
stratification by class. Incorporating this aspect is part of our future work.
Algorithm 1 GreedyCover
Input: Graph G = (V ,E), training proportion t ∈ (0, 1)
Output: Training set T ⊂ V
k ← 0, T ← ∅
for all u ∈ V do
mu ← 0 ⟨⟨mark all nodes 0⟩⟩
end for
while |T | < |V |t do
v ← argmaxu ∈V \T
∑
u′∈N(u) I [mu′ = k]
if
∑
u′∈N(v) I [mu′ = k] = 0 then
k ← k + 1 ⟨⟨incr. min. num. trained neighbors⟩⟩
else
T ← T ∪ {v}
mv ← −1
for all u ′ ∈ N(v) \T do
mu′ ←mu′ + 1
end for
end if
end while
return T
Both of these approaches raise an issue. Since Nettack adds edges to the graph, it changes the degree of the nodes. It
may also change which nodes are the best at covering the unlabeled data. The targets, however, are selected from among
the test set (the nodes with “unknown” labels). These two aspects of the problem setup are in contention: selecting the
target requires knowledge of the training set, but the training set selection requires knowledge of degree, which is not
fully known until after the attack. In Section 4.2, we propose a relatively conservative adaptation of Nettack that avoids
changing the training set. A deeper investigation of the interplay between attacks and defenses will be a focus of future
work.
3.1 Computational Complexity
Using StratDegree andGreedyCover both have computational costs beyond random sampling. StratDegree requires
finding the highest-degree nodes, which, for a constant fraction of the dataset size, will require O(|E | + |V | log |V |)
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time (for computing degrees and sorting), compared to linear time for random sampling. Each step in GreedyCover
requires finding the vertex with the most neighbors minimally connected to the training set. As written in Algorithm 1,
each iteration requires O(|E |) time to count the number of such neighbors each node has, which would result in an
overall running time of O(|V | |E |). This could be improved using a priority queue—such as a Fibonacci heap—to achieve
O(|E | + |V | log |V |) time (O(|V |) logarithmic-time min. extractions and O(|E |) constant-time key updates). Thus, the
two proposed method require moderate overhead compared to the running time for the GCN.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In each experiment, we choose a graph, randomly select a test/validation split (after either deterministically or randomly
selecting the training set), select 40 targets as discussed in Section 2, and perturb the graph either directly or indirectly
to change the target’s classification. We evaluate the perturbation by inspecting the classification margin for the target
node. Specifically, the margins reported here are the log probability ratios for the correct class versus the highest
probability incorrect class, i.e., if the true class is c , the margin is
log pcmaxc ′,c pc ′
.
Thus, if the vertex is correctly classified, the margin will be positive; otherwise it will be negative.
For each target, we perturb up to 50 times. We do the following to determine the budget required for an attacker
to achieve a given probability of success. First, compute the associated quantile of the distribution of margins across
targets (e.g., 10th percentile for 10% attacker success probability) as a function of number of perturbations. We then
determine where this function first becomes nonpositive (i.e., the smallest number of perturbations for the attacker to
successfully cause the target to be misclassified). This value is the required budget. We linearly interpolate between
values for better resolution. If a given level of attack success is never achieved within the perturbations attempted, we
set the required budget to number of perturbations plus 1. We average this value over 5 trials and report standard errors
in the budget plots in Section 5.
4.1 Datasets
We use the three datasets used in the Nettack paper in our experiments, plus one larger citation dataset:
• CiteSeer The CiteSeer dataset has 3312 scientific publications put into 6 classes. The network has 4732 links
representing citations between the publications. The features of the nodes contain 1s and 0s indicating the
presence of the word in the paper. There are 3703 unique words considered for the dictionary.
• Cora The Cora dataset consists of 2708 machine learning papers classified into one of seven categories. The
citation network consists of 5429 citations. For each paper (vertex) in the network there is a feature vector of 0s
and 1s for whether it contains one of 1433 unique words.
• PolBlogs The political blogs dataset consists of 1490 blogs labeled as either liberal or conservative. A total of
19,025 links between blogs form the directed edges of the graph. No attributes are used.
• PubMed The PubMed dataset consists of 19,717 papers pertaining to diabetes classified into one of three classes.
The citation network consists of 44,338 citations. For each paper in the network there is a binary feature vector
representing the presence of 500 words.
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4.2 Defenses and Adaptations
4.2.1 Number of Trained Neighbors with Random Selection. In addition to testing robustness of the proposed data
selection methods, we are interested in whether the same level of robustness can be obtained with a larger amount of
training data. Thus, in addition to randomly selecting 10% of the data for training, we randomly select up to 30% of
the data in 5% increments. In all cases 10% of the data are used for validation. At each point, in addition to evaluating
the robustness of the classifier based on the required adversary budget, we measure the average number of neighbors
connected to a node outside of the training set, i.e., for the training set T ⊂ V , we record
1
|V \T |
∑
i ∈T
∑
j ∈V \T
ai j . (2)
This will allow us to evaluate what impact the overall number of connections to the training data has on performance,
and whether performance with the proposed training data selection methods match any trend observed with random
training.
4.2.2 Adapted Nettack. As mentioned in Section 3, there is an inherent tension between Nettack, which changes the
graph topology, and the training set selection methods, which use topological properties to select training nodes. As a
first-order adaptation of Nettack to these methods, we altered Nettack so that when it considers proposed perturbations,
it does not make perturbations that would change the training dataset. When selecting based on degree, this involves
filtering any perturbations that would push a node across the degree threshold, making a non-training node’s degree
high enough to be a selected or sufficiently reducing a training node’s degree. When using GreedyCover, we filter
perturbations that could increase (or decrease) the number of neighbors that are minimally connected to the training
set to move a node into (or out of) the training set. In both cases we assume the attacker knows the selection method in
use. The code to modify Nettack for these adaptations is provided in the supplement.
4.2.3 Proposed Defenses. Defenses have been proposed since Nettack was published. Here, we consider two such
defenses: removing edges between nodes with no common attributes as in [25], and using a low-rank approximation for
the adjacency matrix as in [9]. In the low-rank case, we use the first 10 components of the singular value decomposition.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Impact of Training Methods
In our first experiments, we apply up to 50 perturbations and attack either structure, attributes, or both. We see that,
across a wide swath of attack success probabilities, the alternative selection methods provide a significant increase in
robustness, often requiring a factor of 2–4 to achieve a given probability of success. Results demonstrating the increase
in required budget are shown in Figure 1. This figure includes influence attacks against randomly selected targets.
Consider the attacks against structure alone. Especially in cases where the probability of attack success is low, we see
both methods provide a significant increase in the adversary’s required budget. In almost all cases, performance using
the alternatives is appreciably better than randomly selecting training data. The increase is less pronounced in cases
where attributes are attacked along with structure.
The improvement in performance is not universal across scenarios. When attributes alone are attacked, for example,
the classifier is often just as robust using random training as the other methods, though the adversary’s required budget
is much higher. In cases where attributes and structure are both perturbed, a slightly higher budget is required for
the adversary to achieve a high probability of success. Thus, the smaller performance gap between random selection
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Fig. 1. Budget required to achieve a given probability of attack success, varying the training data selection method. Results are shown
for GCNs with one hidden layer. Curves are averages across trials and error bars show standard errors. We consider attacks on the
structure of the graph (left column), the vertex attributes (center column), and attacks against both simultaneously (right column). All
results use attacks against neighbors of a randomly selected target. Using GreedyCover consistently outperforms random selection,
often by a factor of 2 and sometimes by a factor of 4. StratDegree also typically shows a substantial benefit.
and the alternative methods makes it more advantageous for the adversary to consider attributes as well as structure.
Understanding this phenomenon is a goal of ongoing work.
We also see low-level improvements that ultimately do not change the rate of attack success. In some cases, it is
exceptionally easy or difficult for an adversary to succeed, and the varied training method does not appreciably change
the number of perturbations for the attacker to succeed. We do, however, see a significant change in how much the
margin is reduced, as shown for the Cora dataset in Figure 2. We see that, although the margin may cross zero at
approximately the same point, the decrease is much more gradual in most cases using the alternative selection methods
(direct attacks being an exception).For example, in attacks against small-margin targets, creating the same reduction in
margin as with 10 perturbations under random selection requires about 20 perturbations using the alternative methods.
We see that the large margin cases are much larger using the baseline method than the alternatives, which makes
those targets less vulnerable to attack, even if their margins decrease more quickly as they are perturbed. Results
with CiteSeer are similar (though performance against direct attacks does not change much with StratDegree or
GreedyCover) and are omitted.
The graph of political blogs is much more difficult to attack, and typically requires more than 50 perturbations for an
attack to be successful. We show the median classification margin for up to 50 perturbations in Figure 3. The behavior of
StratDegree is inconsistent (sometimes worse and sometimes better than random), but GreedyCover is consistently
better than random, even when increasing the amount of training data to 30%. This is true for randomly selected targets
as well as those starting with very high and very low margins. The comparatively poor performance of StratDegree
for random and large-margin targets could be due to the strong community structure in that graph, which high-degree
nodes may not reveal.
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Fig. 2. Median margin after perturbation, varying the training data selection method, in cases that are difficult to improve: direct
attacks (left), small margin cases (center), and large margin cases (right). Attacks are against a GCN with one hidden layer and change
both structure and attributes. In the direct and small margin attacks, even when misclassification occurs (0 crossing) at the same
perturbation level, the margin often decreases faster with random selection.
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Fig. 3. Median margin after perturbation, varying the training data selection method, in the PolBlogs dataset. Attacks change
structure only. In all cases, GreedyCover results in perturbations being less effective.
The PubMed dataset is much larger and we limited our analysis to indirect attacks on the graph structure. As shown
in Figure 4, GreedyCover provides a small but reliable increase in the adversary’s required budget for attack success
probabilities between about 0.3 and 0.7. Again, when we consider the median classification margin, we see that training
using either high degree nodes or GreedyCover makes the initial classification margin smaller, but slows down the
rate at which the margin is reduced by Nettack. This is shown in both small and large margin cases. In the case where
the margin is large, there is a substantial decrease in the classification margin for unperturbed data, especially when
using StratDegree. This, again, is likely due to high-degree nodes no longer being part of the unlabeled test data.
5.2 Impact of Labeled Neighbors
As mentioned in Section 4, we are interested in whether the increase in robustness comes entirely from an increase
in the average number of neighbors in the training set, or if there is something different about using StratDegree
or GreedyCover. Thus, we compare the required adversary budget using the proposed methods to the same with
more randomly selected training data. Results are shown in Table 1. For clarity, we use cases where only structure is
attacked via influencers, where Figure 1 illustrates a clear empirical benefit from both methods. Using StratDegree and
GreedyCover on CiteSeer, a target’s average number of neighbors in the training set is 0.802 and 0.849, respectively,
which falls in between the value for random sampling of 20% and 25% of the data (0.6975 and 0.865, respectively). At
20% attack success probability, there is some substantial variation in the required budget as the random training set
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Fig. 4. Results on the PubMed dataset. GreedyCover provides some increase in the adversary’s required budget when the attack
success probability is around 30%–70%. For cases where the margin is very low or high, the alternative methods slow down the
reduction in margin caused by the attack.
Dataset Thres. %ile 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% StratDegree GreedyCover
CiteSeer 0
20 1.50 (0.17) 2.87 (0.72) 2.25 (0.40) 2.95 (0.75) 1.99 (0.29) 4.02 (0.56) 3.84 (0.47)
50 3.39 (0.53) 6.88 (0.81) 6.65 (0.53) 6.14 (1.01) 6.68 (1.06) 10.88 (2.00) 8.69 (1.61)
80 12.53 (2.04) 19.75 (2.63) 15.01 (1.70) 17.75 (2.61) 14.89 (2.61) 41.04 (4.50) 27.86 (4.34)
Cora 0
20 2.00 (0.36) 2.27 (0.35) 2.90 (0.70) 2.08 (0.17) 3.44 (0.44) 3.50 (0.71) 3.00 (0.53)
50 5.22 (0.85) 5.64 (0.12) 9.19 (1.36) 5.48 (0.47) 8.52 (0.87) 10.92 (2.03) 9.20 (1.17)
80 13.84 (1.24) 13.64 (1.01) 18.25 (1.76) 14.88 (1.15) 21.45 (2.50) 29.34 (6.36) 17.02 (2.71)
PolBlogs ln 1.5
20 1.13 (0.63) 1.90 (1.09) 1.07 (0.46) 2.69 (0.64) 3.76 (2.05) 0.28 (0.15) 1.72 (0.86)
50 41.89 (5.03) 20.00 (10.95) 22.95 (8.89) 34.51 (8.82) 40.16 (6.31) 0.71 (0.29) 50.00 (0.00)
80 50.00 (0.00) 40.32 (8.66) 30.00 (10.95) 40.77 (8.26) 50.00 (0.00) 34.87 (8.97) 50.00 (0.00)
Table 1. Budget required for an adversary to achieve a given level of attack success, varying training set selection method and
amount of training data. Values are the average (with standard error) number of perturbations required for the attacker to succeed
the specified proportion of the time. While more randomly selected training data typically improves performance, it does not do so
consistently, nor does it reliably perform better than StratDegree and GreedyCover. Note that 50 perturbations is the maximum
attempted in all cases, and assigned as the required budget when no level of perturbation succeeds.
size increases, and this variation could potentially explain the increase when using the alternative methods. With 50%
and 80% success, however, the performance remains fairly flat as the average number of neighbors in the training
set increases. Thus, an increase in the amount of training data—to the point where we have the same number of
connections to the average the test vertex—does not necessarily imply greater robustness, which is provided by the
proposed methods.
For Cora, the analogous case is not as conclusive—with random sampling in some cases coming close to the results
using StratDegree—but it is noteworthy that the required budget does not monotonically increase with training set
size. Thus, increasing the amount of randomly selected training data does not reliably improve performance. In this
case, StratDegree (1.135 training neighbors per random target) and GreedyCover (1.084) yield average training
neighbor rates between random sampling of 25% (1.029) and 30% (1.237) of the data.
PolBlogs, as mentioned in Section 5.1, is much more difficult to attack, so we lower the bar for the attacker: we
consider a threshold of ln 1.5 rather than 0, so rather than misclassifying the target, the probability of it belonging
in the correct class is no more than 50% higher than in any incorrect class. (Since PolBlogs has only two classes, this
means the probability of being in the correct class is less than 0.6.) While neither method does better than random at
low attack success rates, GreedyCover saturates at 50% success (50 is the largest number of perturbations used, so
anything not successfully attacked is assumed to require 50). Random sampling sometimes also saturates at a high
10 Miller et al.
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Fig. 5. Results using defenses and an adapted attack on the CiteSeer dataset. Solid lines indicate the original Nettack and classifier,
while dashed lines represent performance when the adaptations and defenses are employed. The adaptation of Nettack (left) does not
substantially change performance and the feature-based defense (center) still benefits from the alternative methods. The low-rank
defense (right) receives no benefit from the alternative methods, though at low attack success probability they are more effective than
the low-rank method and are competitive (without the defense) at higher success rates.
attack success rate. For PolBlogs, StratDegree yields an average of 8.735 training neighbors per random target, more
than using random selection of 30% (8.046), while GreedyCover (6.528) yields a rate between using 25% (6.708) and
30%.
5.3 Impact of Defense and Adaptation
We applied the defenses of [9, 25] to both Cora and CiteSeer, and also used the adapted version of Nettack. As shown in
Figure 5, when Nettack is adapted to avoid changing the training data set, there is not a significant change with the
CiteSeer dataset; the adaptation negatively impacts performance at low probability of attack success but not elsewhere.
At no point does it make the alternative methods less effective than random selection, and at most points they maintain
the performance achieved with no adaptation of the attack. For the feature-based defense of [25], we see an increase in
the adversary’s budget using random selection, as expected, but we also see a small increase in the required budget
using the alternative methods. This suggests that, even when the adversary is cautious about altering the training data,
the StratDegree and GreedyCover are helpful.
The low-rank approximation, on the other hand, does not benefit at all from the alternative methods. They are
competitive with the low-rank defense and in fact provide better robustness at low probability of attack success. When
using the low-rank approximation, however, both StratDegree and GreedyCover usually yield worse performance
than random selection (in fact, performance is similar to when random selection is used for the full graph). This is an
intriguing phenomenon. It could be due to the fact that high-degree nodes often dominate low-rank approximations, so
the alternative methods are not providing much new information, or simply due to the very locally focused nature of
both StratDegree or GreedyCover, the effects of which could be filtered out by a more global method. This result
suggests that these methods should not be used in conjunction with one another.
Results on the Cora dataset are similar and omitted for space.
5.4 Possible Accuracy/Robustness Tradeoff
One additional consideration is whether either of these methods degrades overall system performance, thus yielding a
tradeoff between overall performance and robustness. The experiments we have run so far suggest that there is some
variation, as illustrated in Figure 6. While it seems that StratDegree does slightly degrade classification performance,
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Fig. 6. Distribution of F1 scores (macro aggregated) using all 3 training set selection methods on both datasets before perturbation.
Performance is for a GCN with one hidden layer. The alternative methods, degree-based and greedy-cover, sometimes reduce
performance, suggesting the existence of a tradeoff between robustness and classification performance.
Dataset GCN SVMw/o attributes with attributes node2vec alone attributes alone node2vec + attributes
Cora 0.8560 (0.028) 0.8785 (0.026) 0.8623 (0.024) 0.7471 (0.022) 0.8675 (0.025)
CiteSeer 0.7063 (0.021) 0.7585 (0.021) 0.7071 (0.035) 0.7237 (0.022) 0.7503 (0.033)
Table 2. Vertex classification performance with different classifiers and different features. Mean accuracy (with standard deviation)
across 10 trials is shown. Cora is much more easily classified with structure than attributes, while CiteSeer is more easily classified by
attributes.
it is less clear that the GreedyCover does; it slightly improves performance for CiteSeer. Performance for PolBlogs
is similar to Cora, reducing the F1 score from approximately 0.952 with random training to 0.939 for StratDegree
and 0.911 for GreedyCover. PubMed sees a mild decrease in performance, from 0.855 with random to 0.843 with
StratDegree and 0.852 for GreedyCover.
We considered the possibility that this disparity could be due to importance of structure versus attributes. To explore
this, we decoupled structure from attributes and considered an alternative classifier in which the graph is embedded
into 128-dimensional Euclidean space using node2vec [11], the resulting vector is appended to the node attributes, and
the augmented feature vector is classified using a support vector machine with a radial basis function kernel. Results
are shown in Table 2. Note that classification performance on Cora is much better when ignoring attributes than when
ignoring structure, while classification is easier for CiteSeer when only attributes are used than using structure alone. It
could be that the greater dependence on structure makes classification performance more sensitive to selecting training
data based on structure. This is an important area for future investigation.
5.5 Simulation Results
In an effort to understand what makes the proposed methods effective, we test them in a controlled setting on a
simulated graph. We use a stochastic blockmodel with 5 classes, 400 nodes per class, where classes are aligned with
blocks. Simulation details are provided in the supplement. As with the real data, we ran 5 trials of the same experiments,
in this case generating a new graph for each trial (rather than only changing the train/test/validation split). As shown
in Figure 7, the proposed techniques are only effective at very low probability of attack success. This suggests that both
12 Miller et al.
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Fig. 7. Results of a stochastic blockmodel simulation. The solid line is a case with greater within-community connectivity than the
dashed line. The proposed selection techniques, StratDegree and GreedyCover, are only effective when the probability of attack
success is low. That is, the more heterogeneous the degree distribution of the network, the more benefit our proposed techniques
produce. Note that most real-world networks have heterogeneous degree distributions.
degree-based selection and GreedyCover rely on more heterogeneous degree distributions to provide a benefit to the
user. Investigating this in more detail will be an aspect of future work.
6 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial examples in deep neural networks have received considerable attention since they were documented a few
years ago [22]. Since that time, numerous attack methods have been proposed, largely focused on the image classification
domain (though there has been interest in natural language processing as well, e.g., [13]). In addition to documenting
adversarial examples, Szegedy et al. demonstrated that such examples can be generated using the limited-memory BFGS
(L-BFGS) algorithm, which identifies an adversarial example in an incorrect class with minimal L2 norm to the true data.
Later, Goodfellow et al. proposed the fast gradient sign method (FGSM), where the attacker starts with a clean image and
takes small, equal-sized steps in each dimension (i.e., alters each pixel by the same amount) in the direction maximizing
the loss [10]. Another proposed attack—the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)—iteratively modifies the pixel
with the largest impact on the loss [19]. DeepFool, like L-BFGS, minimizes the L2 distance from the true instance while
crossing a boundary into an incorrect class, but does so quickly by approximating the classifier as linear, stepping
to maximize the loss, then correcting for the true classification surface [17]. Like Nettack, these methods all try to
maintain closeness to the original data (L2 norm for L-BFGS and DeepFool, L0 norm for JSMA, and L∞ norm for FGSM).
The Nettack paper only compares to one of these methods: FGSM. In [25], the authors modify JSMA to use integrated
gradients and show it to be effective against vertex classification. In addition, new attacks against vertex classification
have been introduced, including a method that uses reinforcement learning to identify modifications to graph structure
for an evasion attack [8] and using meta learning for a global (non targeted) attack [30]. Exploring the effects of
StratDegree and GreedyCover on these methods will be interesting future work.
Defenses to attacks such as FGSM and JSMA have been proposed, although several prove to be insufficient against
stronger attacks. Defensive distillation is one such defense, in which a classifier is trained with high “temperature” in
the softmax, which is reduced for classification [20]. While this was effective against the methods from [10, 17, 19, 22], it
was shown in [6] that modifying the attack by changing the constraint function (which ensures the adversarial example
is in a given class) renders this defense ineffective. More defenses have been proposed, such as pixel deflection [21]
and randomization techniques [26], but many such methods are still found to be vulnerable to attacks [1, 2]. Future
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work will also consider defenses that appear promising (e.g., [7, 24]) if they can be applied in the graph domain. More
recent work has focused on robustness of GCNs, including work on robustness to attacks on attributes [31] and more
robust variants of the GCN [28]. In particular, evaluating the impact of StratDegree and GreedyCover on certifiable
robustness as outlined in [4] will be important future work. Finally, attacks against classifiers other than GCNs [27]
and objectives other than vertex classification—such as node embedding [3] and community detection [14]—would be
interesting to consider, to determine whether any strategy works against many adversary tactics.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores the use of complex network characteristics to make vertex classification more robust to the
adversarial poisoning technique Nettack. We consider an alternative approach to enhance robustness to Nettack:
varying the training set selection method based on connections from training to test data. By using these methods,
we see an improvement in robustness, both in terms of increasing the budget required for a successful attack (often
by a factor of 2 or more) and, in cases where this is not possible, making the classifier much less confident in its
incorrect predictions. The level of robustness achieved from the alternative methods is often not obtainable by simply
increasing the amount of training data via random selection. These developments are highly encouraging as we explore
possibilities to enhance vertex classification robustness.
The work documented here points to several open problems and avenues of potential investigation. First and foremost,
developing methods that consistently achieve the highest performance of the GCN on the overall dataset with the higher
robustness is the ultimate goal, and developing a hybrid method of selecting the training data that uses a combination of
randomly selected data and nodes that cover the test set could prove useful if it enables both large classification margins
and robustness to perturbations. Adapting Nettack beyond the first-order adaptation outlined here is another important
problem. A full suite of experiments with several attacks, as recommended in [5], would be highly valuable. Another
interesting question is whether there are certain properties of a graph that make the robustness we pursue possible.
Quantifying a tradeoff between robustness and performance—in the spirit of [23], focused on graph data—would help
elucidate some of the phenomena documented here. We should also consider additional network characteristics such as
the triangle distribution. For example, we observed that direct attacks from Nettack increase triangle count [15] and
it will be interesting to see under what conditions this becomes a reliable attack detector. Robustness to adversarial
activity has driven fascinating research in the image classification domain. We look forward to new discoveries as the
same is done for vertex classification.
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APPENDIX ON REPRODUCIBILITY
Stochastic block model code and parameters. Figure 8 outlines the stochastic block model code and parameters that
we used. For the case with stronger connectivity within communities, within-class connection probability is set to
pin = 0.0140 and between-class connections occur with probability pout = 0.0015 (inprob in Figure 8 is set to 0.0125).
For the less internally connected case, inprob is set to 0.00625. The nodes’ 50 binary features were independent and for
each class a distinct set of 10 features had probability 0.35 of being 1 while all other features had a probability of 0.1.
The function loadSBM returns the adjacency matrix, attribute matrix, and labels in the same format as the load_npz
function in the original Nettack code (available at https://github.com/danielzuegner/nettack).
import numpy as np
import networkx as nx
import scipy.sparse as sp
#inprob: additional internal connection probability (difference
#with between-community probability)
def loadSBM(inprob):
#create graph
N = [400, 400, 400, 400, 400]
x = inprob
y = .004-.2*x
P = x*np.eye(5) + y*np.ones((5, 5))
G = nx.stochastic_block_model(N, P)
A = nx.adjacency_matrix(G).astype('d')
#create attributes
p1 = .35
p2 = .1
Pmat =
np.kron((p1-p2)*np.eye(5)+p2*np.ones(5),
np.ones((400, 10)))
X = np.random.rand(2000, 50) < Pmat
X = sp.csr_matrix(X)
z =
np.kron(np.arange(5), np.ones((400),
dtype=np.int32))
# return adjacency matrix, attribute matrix, and classes
return A, X, z
Fig. 8. Stochastic blockmodel code and parameters
Modified GCN code. Figure 9 contains the modified GCN code that we used to implement the low-rank approximation
of the adjacency matrix. This code replaces code in the Nettack implementation that starts on the line
self.An = tf.SparseTensor( ...
and goes to the assignment of self.h1. In addition, the change made to the last line in Figure 9 (replacing the AXW1
term) is analogously made to the line computing self.h2.
Similarity-based defense code. In Figure 10, we show the implementation of the similarity-based defense. When
considering this defense, any time nettack.GCN.GCN() is called, the function removeDissimilar is first called on the
adjacency matrix and attributes to remove any edges connecting nodes with no feature overlap.
Modified Nettack code. Figure 11 outlines how we changed the Nettack code in order to run the experiments
outlined in the paper. The function filter_training is modeled after filter_singletons and is applied analogously
immediately afterward. While we pass trainingData as a parameter here, this can be computed from the adjacency
16 Miller et al.
Un, Sn, VTn = la.svds(An, k=rank)
SVTn = np.diag(Sn) @ VTn
X_U, X_S, X_VT = la.svds(X_obs, k=rank)
X_SVT = np.diag(X_S) @ X_VT
self.Un = tf.convert_to_tensor(Un, dtype=tf.float32)
self.SVTn = tf.convert_to_tensor(SVTn, dtype=tf.float32)
self.X_sparse = tf.SparseTensor(np.array(X_obs.nonzero()).T,\
X_obs[X_obs.nonzero()].A1,\
X_obs.shape)
self.X_dropout = sparse_dropout(self.X_sparse, 1 - self.dropout,
(int(self.X_sparse.values.get_shape()[0]),))
dropoutArray =
tf.sparse.to_dense(self.X_dropout).eval(session=self.session)
X_drop_U, tempS, tempVT = la.svds(dropoutArray, k=rank)
del dropoutArray
X_drop_SVT = np.diag(tempS) @ tempVT
self.X_drop_U = tf.convert_to_tensor(X_drop_U, dtype=tf.float32)
self.X_drop_SVT = tf.convert_to_tensor(X_drop_SVT, dtype=tf.float32)
self.X_U = tf.convert_to_tensor(X_U, dtype=tf.float32)
self.X_SVT = tf.convert_to_tensor(X_SVT, dtype=tf.float32)
# only use drop-out during training
self.X_comp1 = tf.cond(self.training,
lambda: self.X_drop_U,
lambda: self.X_U) if self.dropout > 0. else self.X_U
self.X_comp2 = tf.cond(self.training,
lambda: self.X_drop_SVT,
lambda: self.X_SVT) if self.dropout > 0. else self.X_SVT
self.W1 = slim.variable('W1',
[self.D, sizes[0]], tf.float32, initializer=w_init())
self.b1 = slim.variable('b1',
dtype=tf.float32, initializer=tf.zeros(sizes[0]))
self.h1 = dot(self.Un, dot(self.SVTn, dot(self.X_comp1,\
dot(self.X_comp2, self.W1))))
Fig. 9. Modified GCN code that uses a low-rank approximation rather than the sparse adjacency matrix. Note that the la package is
scipy.sparse.linalg; all other packages are as in the original code.
import scipy.sparse as sp
def removeDissimilar(A, X):
r, c = sp.triu(A).nonzero()
Xd = X.todense()
for ii in range(len(r)):
if np.dot(Xd[r[ii]], np.transpose(Xd[c[ii]])) == 0:
A[r[ii], c[ii]] = 0
A[c[ii], r[ii]] = 0
Fig. 10. Python function implementing a similarity-based defense. Note that there is no return value and the adjacency matrix is
modified in place.
matrix depending on whether StratDegree or GreedyCover is being used. The amount of training data needs to be
specified.
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def filter_training(edges, adj, labelVec, trainRatio, trainingData):
degs = np.squeeze(np.array(np.sum(adj,0)))
existing_edges = np.squeeze(np.array(adj.tocsr()[tuple(edges.T)]))
if trainingData is None: #stratified thresholding based on degree
nClass = np.max(labelVec)+1
degThres = np.zeros((nClass))
for c in range(nClass):
temp = degs[labelVec==c]
temp = np.sort(temp)
degThres[c] = temp[int(np.floor(len(temp)*(1-trainRatio)))]
old_degrees = degs[np.array(edges)]
if existing_edges.size > 0:
new_degrees = degs[np.array(edges)] + 2*(1-existing_edges[:,None]) - 1
else:
new_degrees = degs[np.array(edges)] + 1
thresholds = degThres[labelVec[np.array(edges)]]
breaks = np.logical_or(np.logical_and((old_degrees< thresholds), (new_degrees >= thresholds)), \
np.logical_and((old_degrees> thresholds), (new_degrees <= thresholds)))
num_breaks = breaks.sum(1)
retVal = (num_breaks == 0)
else: #use greedyCover
nonTrain = np.logical_not(trainingData)
nNonTrainingNeighbors = adj.dot(nonTrain)
#get the largest number of non-training neighbors among non-training data
maxNonTrainNeighbors = np.max(nNonTrainingNeighbors[nonTrain])
minNonTrainNeighbors = np.min(nNonTrainingNeighbors[trainingData])
borderlineTraining = np.logical_and(nNonTrainingNeighbors<= minNonTrainNeighbors+1, trainingData)
borderlineNonTraining = np.logical_and(nNonTrainingNeighbors >= maxNonTrainNeighbors-1, nonTrain)
#don't remove an edge between a borderline training node and a non-training node,
#or add an edge betweeen a borderline non-training node and a non-training node
badRemoval = np.squeeze(np.sum(np.logical_and(borderlineTraining[edges], \
nonTrain[np.fliplr(edges)]), axis=1)>0)
badRemoval = np.logical_and(badRemoval, np.logical_not(existing_edges))
badAddition = np.squeeze(np.sum(np.logical_and(borderlineNonTraining[edges],\
trainingData[np.fliplr(edges)]), axis=1)>0)
badAddition = np.logical_and(badAddition, existing_edges)
assert(np.sum(np.logical_and(badRemoval, badAddition))==0)
breaks = np.logical_or(badAddition, badRemoval)
retVal = np.logical_not(breaks) #return true if the proposed edge does not break the rule
return retVal
Fig. 11. Modified Nettack code: A function used to remove potential perturbations that would change the composition of the training
data.
